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Abstract 
Matching efficiency is one of the most important labor market indicators. It demonstrates 
how effectively the labor market matches unemployed workers to job vacancies. Various factors, 
including government policy, might have an impact on matching efficiency. The main objective 
of this thesis is to explore the influence of government policy on the matching efficiency of 
Minnesota in 1995-2017. The paper describes the process of calculating the monthly values of 
matching efficiency based on a Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant returns to scale. 
This empirically obtained variable is used for examining the relationship between the calculated 
matching efficiency of the labor market of Minnesota and elements of government policy. This 
research studies the impact of a minimum wage, government spending, refugee arrivals, and 
Medicaid enrollment on the state’s matching efficiency. Empirical analysis shows that only one 
investigated potential predictor of matching efficiency has a positive correlation with the 
response variable. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 Matching efficiency is the ability of the labor market to match unemployed workers to 
vacant jobs. Besides the fact that it is an important labor market indicator in itself, matching 
efficiency is a substantial determinant of an unemployment rate, which is one of the major 
indicators of economic activity. The decline of the labor market’s matching efficiency means that 
fewer job matches are formed in the current time period, and it has a negative impact on the 
economy through increased unemployment and reduced welfare. 
 This thesis explores the matching efficiency of the labor market of Minnesota in 1995-
2017 and several factors related to government policy which might have an influence on 
matching efficiency fluctuations. The research is based on the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides 
labor search-matching model. According to Barnichon and Figura (2015), this model has become 
“the canonical framework to introduce equilibrium unemployment in macroeconomic models” 
(p.222). In the framework of this model, the number of new hires is modeled with a Cobb-
Douglas matching function with constant returns to scale. The number of new hires at a given 
time period is the product of multiplying three factors: number of unemployed, number of 
vacancies, and matching efficiency. 
 Matching efficiency measures the productivity of the process of matching job seekers to 
available jobs. It is examined from two different perspectives, which makes this study more 
relevant. The first perspective shows the ability of unemployed workers to find a new job. It is 
important for job seekers to keep in mind that demand for labor force is satisfied by the most 
suitable job candidates. In other words, for being successful in the labor market, job seekers 
should have skills and abilities in demand. A government can impact the matching efficiency of 
the labor market by stimulating people to obtain more demanded occupations, skills, and 
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abilities. For example, several years ago, a report by Manyika et al. (2011) warned of huge talent 
shortages for data and analytics. This report predicted that “by 2018, the United States alone 
could face a shortage of 140,000 to 190,000 people with deep analytical skills as well as 1.5 
million managers and analysts with the know-how to use the analysis of big data to make 
effective decisions”. Realizing the demand, many public universities launched new degree and 
certificate programs in Data Analytics. These actions positively impact the matching efficiency 
of the labor market and employment. 
 On the other hand, matching efficiency demonstrates the effectiveness of companies and 
nonprofit institutions in the labor market. Matching efficiency is the measure of how efficiently 
HR departments fill the job vacancies of their companies. According to a KPMG-sponsored 
study (2012), business leaders across the globe reckon their HR teams are “ineffective” and 
“consistently fail to demonstrate any form of value to their organization”. An improvement in 
labor market performance of firms and organizations might be another way to increase the 
matching efficiency of the labor market.  
 Two parts of the aggregate matching function – the monthly numbers of new hires and 
unemployed people in Minnesota – are available from the Current Population Surveys. The third 
variable, the number of job vacancies, is not available; but a reliable proxy variable for numbers 
of vacancies is computed in Chapter III of this paper. After this estimation, it is possible to 
calculate the fourth, and the main part of the matching efficiency function - monthly values of 
the matching efficiency of Minnesota. 
 It is well-known that government policy might have the microeconomic effects which can 
change the incentives for individual economic decisions of the labor market’s participants. 
Consequently, the implementation of government policy might intentionally or unintentionally 
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have an impact on the main indicators of the labor market, including its matching efficiency. The 
aim of this thesis is to study how the matching efficiency dynamics in Minnesota, found during 
this research, are affected by the state’s government policy. The paper studies the impact of such 
elements of government policy as a minimum wage, government spending, refugee arrivals, and 
Medicaid enrollment. The influence of these factors on the matching efficiency of Minnesota’s 
labor market and the levels of significance of this effect are estimated by creating the linear 
regression model. 
 The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II reviews the literature related to 
the matching efficiency of the labor market and to the impact of government policy on the labor 
market. The first section of Chapter III describes the procedure of constructing the composite 
vacancy posting variable, which combines the print and online help-wanted advertisements in 
Minnesota; the second section demonstrates the process of calculation of the monthly values of 
matching efficiency. Chapter IV estimates the influence of elements of government policy on the 
matching efficiency of Minnesota’s labor market. Finally, Chapter V concludes. 
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Chapter II: Literature Review 
Matching Efficiency of Labor Market 
 The review of the literature related to the matching efficiency of the labor market shows 
that the most prevalent study in this field is a search and matching theory. The main concepts of 
this study and alternative theories are explored in this section.  
Search and matching theory. In one of the fundamental papers of the search and 
matching theory, Blanchard and Diamond (1989) explore the relationship between 
unemployment and vacancies, or the Beveridge curve. In their opinion, this relation is 
understudied despite of the fact that it contains important information about the labor market. 
The authors affirm that about 7 million workers move into or out of employment every month, 
and they investigate these gross flows using data for the postwar USA. Besides this, the main 
objectives of this paper are to examine a matching process and interpret the Beveridge relation. 
The researchers introduce a simple aggregate matching function, which presents the 
complex process of matching unemployed workers to available jobs. The reviewed paper 
describes new matches as a function of both unemployment and vacancies. This interpretation of 
the matching function is used as a main foundation of our thesis.  
Blanchard and Diamond find the strong and stable relation between new hires and both 
unemployment and vacancies. Empirical data of this paper shows that “short- and medium-term 
fluctuations in unemployment have been due mainly to aggregate activity shocks, shocks that 
lead to both more (less) job creation and less (more) job destruction, rather than to changes in the 
degree in reallocation intensity, which lead to parallel movements in job creation and job 
destruction” (p.50). 
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 Another basic conceptual paper of the search and matching theory models a job-specific 
shock process in the matching model of unemployment with non-cooperative wage behavior 
(Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994). The authors establish a model of endogenous job creation and 
job destruction and incorporate it into the matching approach to equilibrium unemployment and 
wage determination. 
Mortensen and Pissarides assume that each job in the labor market can be either “filled 
and producing” or “vacant and searching”. Job creation occurs when a company with an unfilled 
job and a worker meet and start producing; and job destruction takes place when a filled job 
separates and leaves the market. According to the researchers, opening a new job vacancy is not 
job creation, it is only creating a job vacancy. Workers can be “employed and producing” or 
“unemployed and searching”. To simplify the model, the authors do not consider search on the 
job. The rate at which available jobs and unemployed workers meet is defined in this paper by 
the homogeneous-of-degree-one matching function of vacancies and unemployed workers. Our 
thesis is based on this definition and the assumptions of the reviewed paper. 
The results of this research show that an aggregate shock causes a negative correlation 
between job creation and job destruction. Oppositely, a dispersion shock induces a positive 
correlation. In addition, Mortensen and Pissarides conclude that the job destruction process has 
more unstable dynamics comparing with the job creation process. 
The paper of Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) surveys recent work on the existence and 
stability of the aggregate matching function. According to the authors, “the matching function 
summarizes a trading technology between agents who place advertisements, read newspapers 
and magazines, go to employment agencies, and mobilize local networks that eventually bring 
them together into productive matches” (p.391). The main idea of this paper is that the complex 
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exchange process is summarized by a well-behaved function that defines the number of jobs 
created at any moment in time in terms of the number of workers looking for jobs, the number of 
firms looking for workers, and a small number of other variables. In this survey the researchers 
concentrate on the microfoundations underlying the matching function and on its empirical 
effectiveness. 
Investigating the microfoundations behind the aggregate matching function, Petrongolo 
and Pissarides explore other variables that influence the matching rate. The other variables in this 
research can be divided into two groups. The first group consists of everything that individuals 
do during their search. The variables from the second group are unrelated to individual search 
decisions. According to the researchers, the shifts in the matching function that are unrelated to 
the search decisions of individuals are by cause of technological advances in matching and 
aggregation issues.  
The authors admit the complexity of studied concept: “the matching function is a black 
box: we have good intuition about its existence and properties but only some tentative ideas 
about its microfoundations” (p.424). They draw a conclusion that aggregation problems induce 
some of the shifts in the aggregate matching function, however, these shifts are not significant 
enough to make the aggregate function unstable. 
Barnichon and Figura (2015) intend to better understand fluctuations in matching 
efficiency. To this purpose, they create an aggregate matching function that integrates 
heterogeneity across workers and labor market segmentation. The authors incorporate worker 
heterogeneity by admitting different levels of search effectiveness across workers. The labor 
market segmentation is incorporated by assuming that the labor market is segmented in 
submarkets, where each submarket is characterized by a matching technology. Under these 
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assumptions, workers can only match with the available vacancies in their submarkets because of 
geographic distance, skill mismatch, or degree requirements. Our thesis examines the matching 
efficiency of the labor market of Minnesota, which is the segment of the U.S. labor market. 
Considering worker heterogeneity and market segmentation, Barnichon and Figura show 
that matching efficiency has cyclical fluctuations due to variations in the degree of heterogeneity 
in the labor market. Estimating the aggregate matching function, the authors find that “the 
regression residual, which captures movements in matching efficiency, displays procyclical 
fluctuations and a dramatic decline after 2007” (p.222). The reasons of this decline are the 
essential deterioration of the average characteristics of unemployed workers and notable growth 
of dispersion in labor market conditions. 
This thesis determines monthly values of matching efficiency using calculated monthly 
values of help-wanted advertisements as a proxy variable for job vacancies. The process of 
computing monthly values of help-wanted advertisements follows the report of Barnichon 
(2010). This paper builds a vacancy posting index by combining the print Help-Wanted Index 
(HWI) with the online HWI.  
The Conference Board help-wanted online data series is observable only since May 2005, 
therefore the author recovers the online HWI for the time period from January 1995 until May 
2005 (assuming that there are no online help-wanted advertisements until the introduction of the 
World Wide Web in 1995) by estimating the share of print advertising. 
The same approach is used in this thesis for recovering the monthly values of online help-
wanted advertisements in Minnesota. The difference between two papers lies in the polynomial 
function which is used for estimating the share of printed advertising. Barnichon uses a quartic 
polynomial function, whereas this thesis works with a septic polynomial.  
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Alternative theories. The view of unemployment and vacancies of Shimer (2007) is 
conceptually diverse from the point of view of the search and matching theory. The author makes 
a perceptive distinction between search and mismatch. According to this paper, the search theory 
states that unemployed workers actively search for a new employer after leaving their old jobs. 
Oppositely, the mismatch model of Shimer claims that unemployed workers are attached to their 
geographic locations and occupations. The researcher describes that “mismatch is a theory of 
former steel workers remaining near a closed plant in the hope that it reopens. Search is a theory 
of former steel workers moving to a new city to look for positions as nurses.” (p.1074).  
This paper creates a dynamic stochastic model of mismatch and promotes the hypothesis 
that at any point in time, the skills and geographical location of unemployed workers are poorly 
matched with the skill requirements and location of job openings. According to the author, the 
rate at which unemployed workers find jobs is contingent on three factors: the rate at which 
unemployed workers obtain more demanded occupations or move to locations with available 
jobs, the rate at which jobs are created in locations with available workers, and the rate at which 
employed workers leave jobs in locations with suited unemployed workers.  
Shimer states that the mismatch model explains much of the variability in vacancies and 
unemployment and clarifies why these variables have similar perseverance. In addition, this 
model predicts that the job finding rate will decline with unemployment duration even if workers 
are homogeneous. The author claims that these findings are problematic in the matching model. 
In his other paper, Shimer (2005) argues that the search and matching theory cannot 
explain the cyclical behavior of two of its central elements, unemployment and vacancies, which 
are both highly volatile and strongly negatively correlated in U.S. data. In addition, according to 
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the author, the search and matching model cannot interpret the strong procyclicality of the job 
finding rate of an unemployed worker.  
The researcher concentrates on two causes of shocks: changes in labor productivity and 
changes in the separation rate of employed workers from their jobs. Shimer claims that “a search 
and matching model in which wages are determined by Nash bargaining cannot generate 
substantial movements along a downward-sloping Beveridge curve in response to shocks of a 
plausible magnitude. A labor productivity shock results primarily in higher wages, with little 
effect on the V/U ratio. A separation shock generates an increase in both unemployment and 
vacancies” (p.45). However, the author emphasizes that his research is not an attack on the 
search and matching theory, but rather a critique of the Nash bargaining assumption which is 
generally used for wage determination.  
Brown, Merkl, and Snower (2009) introduce an incentive theory of labor market 
matching. This theory explains the labor market matching process using microeconomic 
incentives. The authors have doubts that the matching function is constant with respect to labor 
market policies that are implemented to improve the effectiveness of the matching process. In 
addition, various labor and macroeconomic shocks might also impact the matching function. The 
researchers argue that in analyzing the effects of many macroeconomic shocks, including labor 
policies, the matching function may be replaced by a choice-theoretic framework that deals with 
the basic microeconomic decisions determining the matching process. 
The authors calibrate their incentive model for the economy of the United States and 
demonstrate that it can describe some important empirical regularities which the traditional 
matching model does not explain. According to the researchers, this model creates labor market 
variabilities that are close to the empirical data for the unemployment rate, job finding rate, and 
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separation rate. Also, it generates a strong negative correlation between the job finding rate and 
unemployment rate. In addition, the incentive model clarifies a strong negative correlation 
between job creation and job destruction.  
Brown, Merkl, and Snower conclude that the matching function depicts matches as the 
output of a matching technology that mechanically connects unemployed workers and available 
jobs. Contrastingly, their incentive theory “explains the matching probability in terms of the 
firm’s job offer incentive and the worker’s job acceptance incentive. Similarly, the separation 
probability is explained in terms of the firm’s firing incentive and the worker’s quit incentive. 
These incentives depend on all the parameters of the model, including policy and macro 
parameters” (p.23). 
Kohlbrecher, Merkl, and Nordmeier (2016) focus on the potential role of idiosyncratic 
productivity for job creation. The authors use German administrative wage data to calibrate their 
model and to demonstrate how idiosyncratic productivity shocks influence the elasticity of the 
job finding rate with respect to market tightness. 
The researchers assume that every worker meet a firm with a constant probability. This 
would be a special case of a Cobb-Douglas contact function in which the overall number of 
contacts does not respond to vacancies. The paper denotes this case as a degenerate contact 
function. As a result of different idiosyncratic productivity, firms select workers with larger 
realizations.  
Kohlbrecher, Merkl, and Nordmeier show “analytically and numerically that the 
degenerate contact function with idiosyncratic productivity shocks generates an equilibrium 
comovement between matches, unemployment, and vacancies that is observationally equivalent 
to a Cobb-Douglas constant returns contact function” (p.3).  
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According to the authors, one of their contributions is to demonstrate that dynamic labor 
market models with vacancy free entry and idiosyncratic productivity create a time-series 
behavior that is consistent with matching function estimations. The researchers make a 
conclusion that the combined model with traditional contact function and idiosyncratic 
productivity shocks has important implications.  
According to Chugh and Merkl (2016), selection as an important margin of adjustment in 
hiring decisions of firms is a long-standing realistic idea, but macro-labor analysis has not 
emphasized it much. This research is mostly concentrated on the cross-sectional distribution of 
idiosyncratic productivity for new workers. To explore this dispersion, the researchers use the 
1982 U.S. Employer Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP) data. The focus of the authors in this 
paper, unlike many others who use the EOPP data, is on the cross-sectional dispersion of training 
costs of new hires. 
The results of the selection model are determined by a distributional assumption about 
heterogeneous training characteristics, and, consecutively, these results depend on “how large the 
mass of individuals is that moves across the endogenously time-varying selection threshold 
conditional on aggregate productivity shocks” (p.1372).  
Using microeconomic data on heterogeneity in training costs allows Chugh and Merkl to 
demonstrate that the labor selection model displays large fluctuations in aggregate labor markets. 
Based on this paper’s microcalibration, an efficient labor selection mechanism, conditional on 
productivity shocks, can explain approximately 40% of empirically relevant fluctuations in the 
U.S. job finding rate. The researchers consider that the efficient selection model’s results, which 
are several times larger than in an efficient search and matching model, are valid for both partial 
and general equilibrium fluctuations. 
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Elements of Government Policy and Labor Market 
 The impact of specific elements of government policy (a minimum wage, government 
spending, refugee arrivals, and Medicaid enrollment) on matching efficiency is not addressed in 
the literature. Therefore, this section of the second chapter explores the relationship between the 
mentioned elements of government policy and the labor market, not its matching efficiency. 
Based on the review of the literature, this section highlights important conclusions (some of them 
contradictory to each other) from studies of the labor market effects of government policy.  
 Minimum Wage. Stonecipher and Wilcox (2015) focus on the relationship between an 
increase in the minimum wage and the loss of jobs. Besides analyzing existing research, this 
report undertakes more extensive research into states which raised the minimum wage in recent 
years.  
 The authors compare job growth in states where the minimum wage was raised since 
January 1, 2014 with states where the minimum wage increase did not happen. In addition, this 
paper compares the current numbers of jobs in cities and counties where the minimum wage 
increased at least one year ago with the number of jobs before this rise. 
 The researchers claim that their analysis of existing research did not find clear evidence 
to approve the statement that the increase in the minimum wage causes employers to reduce jobs. 
Additionally, this study’s investigation of employment statistics did not find the confirmation of 
employment loss in states which have increased the minimum wage. Moreover, this examination 
found more evidence that the increase in the minimum wage has resulted in the faster increase of 
employment in these states. As a result, Stonecipher and Wilcox conclude that employment 
statistics in cities and counties where the minimum wage has increased do not show the decline 
in the levels of employment. 
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 Meer and West (2016) explore whether the minimum wage effects employment through a 
discrete change in its level or if it is reflected over time. The researchers use a long-time (1975-
2012) panel of aggregate employment metrics for the population of employers in the USA. 
 The researchers state that the prior literature has mostly assumed that an increase in the 
minimum wage has minimal effects on employment. However, they argue that if the true effects 
are dynamic, conclusions in the previous related literature would misjudge this relationship. The 
authors show that job growth is systematically negatively affected by the minimum wage. The 
findings of the reviewed paper illustrate that employment essentially declines due to increases in 
the minimum wage. 
 Meer and West find that “their results are robust to a number of specifications and that 
the minimum wage reduces employment over a longer period of time than the literature has 
focused on in recent years” (p.518). 
 Government Spending. According to Abrams (1999), empirical research in the literature 
found a negative relationship between government size and economic growth. 
 The researcher provides several reasons to suppose that there is a connection between 
government size and unemployment. Big governments mean large income tax rates. In their turn, 
large tax rates might affect work-leisure decisions of individuals and could extend search time 
between bouts of unemployment. Also, big governments would presumably finance public health 
insurance. Consequently, the cost of unemployment to the individual might be reduced by 
profitable unemployment insurance schemes. In addition, assuming all other factors equal, big 
governments reduce the size of the private sector. The author considers that unemployment 
arising from a reduction in one specific part of the private sector cannot be quickly reabsorbed 
into other parts of the private sector.  
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 This report shows that a one percent increase in government spending as a percent of 
GDP would enhance the unemployment rate by approximately 0.36 of one percent. The 
researcher draws a conclusion that his findings in this paper “support the hypothesis that 
increases in government size, ceteris paribus, generally provide expenditure and tax effects that 
raise reported unemployment (p.400)”. 
 Ramey (2012) examines whether increases in government spending stimulate private 
activity. Particularly, the author explores the effects of government spending on labor markets.  
 The researcher begins her investigation of the effects of government spending on 
unemployment by developing a case study of labor markets during the World War II (WWII) 
period. Using the Variance-Covariance (VAR) methods on various samples she uncovers that an 
increase in government spending reduces unemployment. However, Ramey finds that “in the 
great majority of time periods and specifications, all of the increase in employment after a 
positive shock to government spending is due to an increase in government employment, not 
private employment” (p.2). According to these results, the employment effects of government 
spending appear by the direct hiring of workers, but not through stimulating the private sector to 
hire more workers. The author makes a conclusion that government spending does not stimulate 
private activity. 
 In her other paper, Ramey (2011) reviews the state of knowledge about the government 
spending multiplier and estimates the multiplier value for a temporary, deficit-financed increase 
in government purchases. The author concludes that “the aggregate multiplier for a temporary 
rise in government purchases not accompanied by an increase in current distortionary taxes is 
probably between 0.8 and 1.5” (p.683). Also, she reports that each $35,000 of government 
spending produces one extra job.   
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 Refugee Arrivals. The purpose of the paper of Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2013) is to review 
the economics literature on the impacts of forced migration. According to the authors, most 
studies have concentrated in a few forced migration situations, specifically: internal displacement 
in Northern Uganda, internal displacement in Colombia, the refugee inflow from Burundi and 
Rwanda to Tanzania and the forced migration due to events related to WWII. 
 The researchers draw a conclusion that “the impact of the refugee arrivals on the 
receiving communities seems to be mixed, with the literature clearly identifying winners and 
losers” (p.783). According to this paper, agricultural producers can take advantage of the cheaper 
labor force represented by forced migrants. In addition, food aid funds for refugees lead to the 
increase in demand for products of agricultural producers, therefore they might be an example of 
winners. The potential losers might contain the unemployed local workers who were displaced 
by forced migrants in the labor market. 
 Card (1990) examines the consequences of the Mariel Boatlift, when Cuban immigrants 
arrived in Miami on boats from May to September 1980 and increased the labor force of the 
Miami metropolitan area by 7%. This paper summarizes the effects of the Boatlift on the Miami 
labor market, concentrating on wages and unemployment rates of less-skilled workers. The 
research uses individual micro-data for 1979-1985. 
 The researcher concludes that the arrival of about 125,000 Cuban refugees did not have a 
substantial impact on the Miami labor market. The wages rate and unemployment of less-skilled 
non-Cuban workers in Miami were unaffected. Nevertheless, the author distinguishes Miami 
from other American cities because of large waves of immigrants before the Mariel Boatlift, 
which helped this city to be better prepared to accept new immigrants. For this reason, the Miami 
labor market was able to absorb the Mariel immigrants promptly and without economic damages. 
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 Mayda, Parsons, Peri, and Wagner (2017) explore the long-term influence of refugees on 
the U.S. labor market over the period 1980-2010. In this report the authors provide new 
empirical evidence by investigating the economic impact of refugee resettlement in the USA on 
local labor markets. 
 The empirical analysis of this paper uses exogenous variation in refugee cases “without 
U.S. ties”, or refugees who did not choose the initial specific location of resettlement within the 
country because they did not have friends or family members in the USA. The researchers make 
a conclusion that “their results provide robust causal evidence that there is no adverse long-term 
impact of refugees on the U.S. labor market” (p.16). 
 Medicaid Enrollment. According to Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo (2014), health 
insurance in the United States is tightly connected to employment. Many Americans can access 
affordable health insurance only through their employer. Therefore, extensions of public health 
insurance might have essential effects on the labor market.  
 In 2005, approximately 170,000 adults in Tennessee lost public health insurance 
coverage as a result of a discontinuation of the expansion of TennCare, the state’s Medicaid 
system. This paper uses this cessation to estimate the effect of public health insurance eligibility 
on the labor supply of childless adults.  
 The authors find that a large increase in labor supply among individuals working more 
than 20 hours a week and having private, employer-provided health insurance was caused by the 
TennCare disenrollment. The researchers also examine the dynamic effects of this disenrollment 
and discover that it almost immediately resulted in the increase in job search behavior, 
employment, and health insurance coverage.  
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 The results of this paper show that public health insurance eligibility can have substantial 
effects on labor supply. Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo conclude that “the labor supply 
changes appear to be a means of securing access to private health insurance, and they 
demonstrate a large amount of employment lock” (p.690). The authors assume that if the main 
reason for staying on the job for some workers is to afford health insurance, the Medicaid 
expansion under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) may reduce labor supply.  
 Duggan, Goda, and Jackson (2017) consider that provisions of the ACA weaken the tie 
between employment and health insurance. To identify the effect of the ACA on insurance 
coverage and labor market outcomes in the first year after its implementation, the authors use 
proxies for expected treatment “intensity” of the ACA. 
 The researchers admit that it is difficult to distinguish the effects of the law from other 
changes that would have happened without it. The authors consider that health insurance 
coverage might rise essentially because of growth in economic activity. Therefore, it is basically 
an empirical question what portion of the increase in health insurance coverage was caused by 
the ACA and what part was induced by other factors. 
 According to the researchers, their results indicate that the ACA had a significant impact 
on overall health insurance coverage. They find that Medicaid coverage is increasing in both 
expansion and non-expansion states, however, the increase in expansion states is approximately 
three times larger. Duggan, Goda, and Jackson find “little evidence of changes in labor force 
participation, employment, self-employment, part-time status, wages, or hours that occurred 
differentially in places where ACA-induced coverage gains were the highest” (p.6). Therefore, 
the results of this paper suggest that the implementation of the ACA mostly did not affect labor 
market outcomes in 2014. 
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Chapter III: Matching Efficiency of Minnesota 
Introduction 
The third chapter of this paper presents the process of calculating monthly values of the 
matching efficiency of Minnesota in 1995-2017.  
According to Blanchard and Diamond (1989), the matching function relates the flow of 
new hires to the stocks of vacancies and unemployment. The matching function is assumed 
increasing in both its arguments, concave and homogeneous of degree 1. Barnichon and Figura 
(2015) consider that in a continuous time framework, the flow of hires is typically modeled with 
a Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant returns to scale.  
The equation of the matching function is 
Ht = mt Utσ Vt1-σ   (1) 
where  Ht is the number of new hires at a given time t,  
Ut is the number of unemployed at a given time t,  
Vt is the number of vacancies at a given time t,  
mt is the value of matching efficiency at a given time t. 
Matching efficiency has the range between 0 and 1 (or 100%). This indicator might be 
equal to 1 (100%) only if the number of unemployed at a given time is equal to the numbers of 
vacancies and new hires. If matching efficiency is equal to 0, there are no any new hires.  
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) state that on average, an unemployed worker finds a job 
during a given time t with probability Ht / Ut. If we imagine the hypothetical situation in the 
labor market where matching efficiency is equal to 1, this probability would also be equal to 1 
(100%). The inverse of this probability is the duration of unemployment for an average 
unemployed worker. Similarly, a vacant job is filled with probability Ht / Vt.  According to the 
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authors, “the aggregate matching function is a useful device for introducing heterogeneities 
across workers, by making the probability Ht / Ut depend on individual characteristics” (p.392). 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) by Flood, King, Ruggles, and Warren 
(2017) provide the numbers of new hires in Minnesota from 1995. The numbers of unemployed 
in Minnesota are also available on the IPUMS website. A composite help-wanted data that 
monitors the number of help-wanted advertisements in major sources will be used as a proxy 
variable for vacancy posting. The total number of help-wanted advertisements will be computed 
in the next section. Finally, the monthly values of the matching efficiency of the state’s labor 
market will be calculated in the last section of this chapter. 
Calculating Total Number of Help-Wanted Advertisements 
This section describes the construction of the composite help-wanted data of Minnesota 
that combines print help-wanted advertisements available over 1970-2009 with online help-
wanted advertisements available since May 2005.  
The print help-wanted advertisements data is the seasonally adjusted time series with 
cyclical fluctuations (Figure 3.1).  
 
Figure 3.1. Print Help-Wanted Advertisements in Minnesota, 1970-2009 
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The online help-wanted advertisements data is also the seasonally adjusted data series. In 
Figure 3.2 below we can see that online advertisements have cyclical fluctuations (e.g. a trough 
in 2009 during the last recession). 
 
Figure 3.2. Online Help-Wanted Advertisements in Minnesota, May 2005-2017 
 Let’s denote PAt and OAt the number of print help-wanted advertisements and online 
help-wanted advertisements respectively. The total number of advertisements (the combination 
of print and online advertisements) is TAt, where TAt = PAt + OAt, and S
PA
t is the share of print 
help-wanted advertisements in total advertisements.  
There are four separate periods: 
1) January 1970 - December 1994. Let’s assume that the first online advertisements appeared 
after the introduction of the World Wide Web in 1995, therefore TAt = PAt. This period will not 
be used for this research, but it will be necessary for estimating SPAt. 
2) January 1995 - April 2005. PAt is available for this period, but OAt is not. We need to estimate 
the share of print advertising to recover OAt: OAt = PAt x (1 - SPAt) / SPAt. After that we can 
calculate TAt: TAt = PAt + OAt. 
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3) May 2005 - December 2009. Both parts of the total number of advertisements, PAt and OAt, 
are observable, thus TAt = PAt + OAt. 
4) January 2010 - December 2017. Let’s assume that there is no printed job posting during this 
period (even if there were some printed advertisements, let’s suppose they duplicated existed 
online job postings), therefore TAt = OAt. 
To obtain an estimate of SPAt, let’s follow Barnichon (2010), and interpret the downward 
trend in print help-wanted advertisements over 1995-2009 as “a secular decline in print 
advertising due to the emergence of online advertising and the world wide web” (p.176). The 
author fitted a quartic polynomial in his paper, however a septic polynomial is fitted to print 
help-wanted advertisements over 1970-2009 for this research. Figure 3.3 shows the actual values 
of print help-wanted advertisements and the values of the septic polynomial function for the 
1995-2009 period. 
 
Figure 3.3. Print Help-Wanted Advertisements and Septic Polynomial Values, 1995-2009 
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As a result, we can estimate the print share at time t as the ratio of the septic polynomial's 
value at time t to the septic polynomial's value in January 1995 (Figure 3.4). 
 
Figure 3.4. Estimated Share of Print Advertising in Minnesota, 1995-2009 
The values of printed advertisements and online advertisements are available from May 
2005. Therefore, it is possible to compare the estimated share of print advertising with its real 
share over May 2005 - December 2009. (Figure 3.5). 
 
Figure 3.5. Real and Estimated Shares of Print Advertising in Minnesota, May 2005-2009 
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As we can see in Figure 3.5, these two time series are close to each other. Consequently, 
we can make a conclusion that the estimated share of print advertising calculated using the septic 
polynomial function is justified, and it might be used for calculating the total number of 
advertisements.  
Now it is possible to compute the total number of help-wanted advertisements in 
Minnesota in 1995-2017 using the following steps of the simple algorithm:  
First, let’s calculate the total numbers for the period of January 1995 - May 2005 using 
the share of print advertising.  
Second, we can calculate the total numbers for the period from June 2005 until December 
2009 adding up printed advertisements and online advertisements.  
Finally, the total numbers of advertisements for the period of January 2010 - December 
2017 are the same as the numbers of online advertisements.  
Figure 3.6 represents the result of this calculation – the total number of help-wanted 
advertisements. 
 
Figure 3.6. Total Help-Wanted Advertisements in Minnesota, 1995-2017 
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Calculating Matching Efficiency 
This section of the third chapter calculates monthly values of matching efficiency.  
The job finding rate (JFR) at a time t, ft is the ratio of new hires to the stock of 
unemployed, 𝑓𝑡 =
𝐻𝑡
𝑈𝑡
 and 
ft = mt Utσ-1Vt1-σ 
Denoting 𝜃𝑡 =
𝑉𝑡
𝑈𝑡
, we have 
ft = mt θt1-σ   (2) 
where 𝜃𝑡 =
𝑉𝑡
𝑈𝑡
  is the average labor market tightness (LMT) at a time t.  
Let’s take natural logarithms of both sides of the equation (2): 
ln ft = ln mt + (1-σ) ln θt 
We can represent the natural logarithm of matching efficiency at any given time t as the 
sum of its mean and the residual at time t: 
ln mt = ln m͞ + εt 
where ln ͞m is the mean of a sample ln m1, ln m2, … , ln mt.  
Using the fact that ln ͞m is constant and equal to the value of the intercept, we can 
estimate the matching function in this log-linear form: 
ln ft = ln m͞ + (1-σ) ln θt + εt   (3) 
This equation allows us to calculate the matching efficiency of the labor market of 
Minnesota in 1995-2017.  
Firstly, let’s calculate the values of the job finding rate dividing the numbers of new hires 
by the numbers of unemployed: 𝑓𝑡 =
𝐻𝑡
𝑈𝑡
. The results are presented in Figure 3.7. 
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Figure 3.7. Job Finding Rate in Minnesota, 1995-2017 
Secondly, we calculate the average labor market tightness dividing the numbers of 
vacancies by the numbers of unemployed: 𝜃𝑡 =
𝑉𝑡
𝑈𝑡
 (Figure 3.8).  
 
Figure 3.8. Average Labor Market Tightness in Minnesota, 1995-2017 
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 Next, let’s estimate equation (3), ln ft = ln m͞ + (1-σ) ln θt + εt, over 1995-2017 creating 
the simple linear regression model. The natural logarithm of the job finding rate is the predicted 
variable, and the natural logarithm of the average labor market tightness is the predictor variable 
of this model. Table 3.1 presents the results of this model.  
Table 3.1. Results and Estimates of the Model with ln (JFR) as the Response Variable and 
ln (LMT) as the Control Variable 
Linear Regression Equation:  
ln (JFR) = -0.658473 + 0.593867 * ln (LMT) 
Summary of Fit:  
Observations 276 
RSquare 0.522468 
RSquare Adj. 0.520726 
Root Mean Square Error 0.241143 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.517417 
Parameter Estimates:  
Intercept:  
Estimate -0.658473 
Standard Error 0.044107 
t Ratio -14.93 
Prob > | t | < 0.0001* 
ln (LMT):  
Estimate 0.593867 
Standard Error 0.034299 
t Ratio 17.31 
Prob > | t | < 0.0001* 
F Ratio 299.7840 
Prob > F < 0.0001* 
                Note: * Significant at the 1 percent level. 
As we can see in the table above, RSquare is 0.5225, which means that more than half of 
the total variation is explained by the model. The correlation between two variables is very 
strong (0.7228) and positive. The estimated coefficient of the regressor and the F ratio of the 
model are statistically significant at the 1% level. Figure 3.9 plots the empirical job finding rate, 
its predicted value, and the residuals of the model. 
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Figure 3.9. Residuals, Actual and Predicted Values of the Model with ln (JFR) as the 
Response Variable and ln (LMT) as the Control Variable 
This linear regression estimates the coefficient of the independent variable of this model. 
Equation (3) defines the value of this coefficient as the value of 1-σ. According to the regression 
equation of this model, 1-σ is 0.594. Consequently, σ is 1 - 0.594 = 0.406. All other necessary 
parts for the last computation – the numbers of new hires, numbers of unemployed, and numbers 
of new vacancies – were already available. Therefore, let’s make the last step of the process of 
calculating the monthly values of matching efficiency using the following formula: 
𝒎𝒕 =
𝑯𝒕
𝑼𝒕
𝝈 𝑽𝒕
𝟏−𝝈   (4) 
 The results of this calculation - the values of the matching efficiency of Minnesota’s 
labor market in 1995-2017 - are shown in Figure 3.10. 
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Figure 3.10. Matching Efficiency of Minnesota’s Labor Market, 1995-2017 
 We can compare two indicators of the labor market – the calculated matching efficiency 
and an unemployment rate. Figure 3.11 presents the matching efficiency of the labor market of 
Minnesota and the state’s unemployment rate at the same graph.  
 
Figure 3.11. Matching Efficiency and Unemployment Rate in Minnesota, 1995-2017 
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 The value of the correlation coefficient between two variables is -0.2581, which means 
that there is a weak negative correlation between two variables. This empirical conclusion 
confirms the theoretical assumption that the increase in matching efficiency positively effects on 
the labor market reducing the unemployment rate. 
 The actual values of the unemployment rate, its predicted values by the regression model, 
which has the equation Unemployment Rate = 0.0596 - 0.0279*Matching Efficiency, and the 
residuals of this model, are presented in Figure 3.12. We can see that the residuals display a 
systematic pattern, it is a clear sign that there is a positive serial correlation and that this model 
fits the data poorly. 
 
Figure 3.12. Residuals, Actual and Predicted Values of the Model with the Unemployment Rate 
as the Response Variable and Matching Efficiency as the Control Variable 
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Chapter IV: Matching Efficiency and Government Policy 
This chapter examines a correlation between the matching efficiency of the labor market 
of Minnesota and the elements of government policy. Particularly, this research studies a 
minimum wage, government spending, refugee arrivals, and Medicaid enrollment. 
Matching Efficiency and Minimum Wage 
 The minimum wage in the United States is set by U.S. labor law and a range of state and 
local laws. Employers generally have to pay workers the highest minimum wage prescribed by 
federal, state, and local law. Since July 24, 2009, the federal government has mandated a 
nationwide minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. Since January 1, 2018, small employers in 
Minnesota, whose annual receipts are less than $500,000 and who do not engage in interstate 
commerce, can pay their employees $7.87 per hour. For large employers, the minimum wage is 
$9.65 per hour. This research uses the minimum wage for the large employers in Minnesota.  
 
Figure 4.1. National Consumer Price Index, 1995-2017. (Jan 1995 = 1)  
Source: https://fred.stlouisfed.org 
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Let’s assume that the correlation between matching efficiency and the minimum wage 
depends on the U.S. inflation rate. For this reason, we can use the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as 
a measure that examines the weighted average of prices of a basket of consumer goods and 
services. The CPI is used to adjust the minimum wage for inflation.  
Figure 4.1 above presents the monthly values of the national CPI for the time period of 
1995-2017 with the base period of January 1995 (for simplicity let’s assume that January 1995 is 
the base month).  
 The dynamics of the state minimum wage in Minnesota and the federal minimum wage in 
1995-2017 are presented in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1. Dynamics of Minimum Wage in Minnesota, 1995-2017 
Time Period State Minimum Wage Federal Minimum Wage 
01/01/1995 – 09/30/1996 $4.25 $4.25 
10/01/1996 – 08/31/1997 $4.25 $4.75 
09/01/1997 – 07/31/2005 $5.15 $5.15 
08/01/2005 – 07/23/2007 $6.15 $5.15 
07/24/2007 – 07/23/2008 $6.15 $5.85 
07/24/2008 – 07/23/2009 $6.15 $6.55 
07/24/2009 – 07/31/2014 $6.15 $7.25 
08/01/2014 – 07/31/2015 $8.00 $7.25 
08/01/2015 – 07/31/2016 $9.00 $7.25 
08/01/2016 – 12/31/2017 $9.50 $7.25 
Source: http://www.dli.mn.gov  
Note: the actual minimum wage (bold) is the highest of two wages.  
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As we can see in the table above, in 2017 the minimum wage in Minnesota increased 
more than twice since 1995. But this increase is nominal. For obtaining the real increase in the 
state’s minimum wage, we can calculate the real minimum wage using the national Consumer 
Price Index. Figure 4.2 presents the dynamics of both nominal and real minimum wage in 
Minnesota at the same graph. 
 
Figure 4.2. Nominal and Real Minimum Wage in Minnesota, 1995-2017 
 According to Figure 4.2, the real minimum wage in Minnesota in December of 2017 
increased by almost 1.4 times since January of 1995. 
 Theoretically, there is a positive correlation between the minimum wage hikes and 
increased unemployment, especially for young and unskilled workers. This research explores the 
correlation between the real minimum wage and the matching efficiency of the whole labor 
market of Minnesota. This correlation is equal to -0.1468. We can conclude that the correlation 
between two variables is negative and negligible. 
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 Figure 4.3 compares the actual values of matching efficiency with the predicted values by 
the linear regression model (the equation is Matching Efficiency = 0.7083 - 0.0377*Real 
Minimum Wage) and shows the residuals of this model.  
 
Figure 4.3. Residuals, Actual and Predicted Values of the Model with Matching Efficiency as the 
Response Variable and the Real Minimum Wage as the Control Variable 
Matching Efficiency and Government Spending 
 The second variable, which might be correlated with the matching efficiency of the labor 
market of Minnesota, is government spending. This part of research uses the values of 
Minnesota’s total government spending, which includes state and local government spending. 
The values of federal government spending also might have an influence on the labor market of 
Minnesota. However, the purpose of this thesis is to find the correlation between matching 
efficiency and government policy in Minnesota, and the government of Minnesota does not 
relate to federal government spending.  
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 Table 4.2 presents the annual values (in billions of dollars) of government spending in 
Minnesota in 1995-2017 and the values of government spending as a percentage of gross 
domestic product (GDP) of Minnesota. 
Table 4.2. State and Local Government Spending in Minnesota, 1995-2017  
Year State ($ bln) Local ($ bln) Total 
($ bln) % of GDP 
1995 10.7 16.3 27.0 20.0 
1996 11.3 16.6 27.9 19.1 
1997 11.5 16.7 28.2 17.9 
1998 12.4 18.1 30.5 18.2 
1999 13.4 18.5 31.9 18.1 
2000 15.7 19.7 35.4 18.5 
2001 16.4 20.9 37.3 19.1 
2002 18.4 22.1 40.5 19.9 
2003 19.3 22.5 41.8 19.3 
2004 18.5 23.0 41.5 18.0 
2005 19.4 23.5 42.9 17.6 
2006 19.8 24.7 44.5 17.8 
2007 21.2 26.0 47.2 18.2 
2008 23.1 27.8 50.9 19.3 
2009 25.1 29.3 54.4 21.1 
2010 27.5 28.5 56.0 20.7 
2011 27.4 28.3 55.7 19.7 
2012 27.8 28.8 56.6 19.3 
2013 27.0 28.9 55.9 18.4 
2014 29.6 30.0 59.6 18.8 
2015 30.4 30.8 61.2 18.7 
2016 31.4 31.7 63.1 18.8 
2017 32.3 32.7 65.0 18.8 
  Source: https://www.usgovernmentspending.com  
 In 2017, total state and local government spending was $65 bln, which is 2.4 times more 
than $27 bln in 1995. Nevertheless, this research uses the values of government spending as a 
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percentage of GDP of Minnesota, which is the more informative indicator. Both time series – 
government spending in billions of dollars and government spending as a percentage of 
Minnesota’s GDP – are presented in Figure 4.4.  
 
Figure 4.4. Government Spending in Minnesota: Values and Percentage of GDP, 1995-2017 
 As we can see in this figure, government spending as a percentage of GDP had cyclical 
fluctuations during 1995-2017. 
 In theory, government spending can create jobs to reduce unemployment. However, the 
impact of increased (or decreased) government spending (in any level – federal, state, or local) 
on the labor market’s matching efficiency of the specific state (or an economy as a whole) is 
mostly unknown. 
 The correlation coefficient between the matching efficiency of the labor market of 
Minnesota and total (state and local) government spending in Minnesota as a percentage of 
state’s GDP is equal to -0.2188. This means that there is a weak negative correlation between 
two variables. 
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 The actual values of matching efficiency, its predicted values by the regression equation 
Matching Efficiency = 1.0944 - 2.9709*Government Spending (% of GDP), and the residuals are 
presented in Figure 4.5. 
 
Figure 4.5. Residuals, Actual and Predicted Values of the Model with Matching Efficiency as the 
Response Variable and Government Spending (% of GDP) as the Control Variable 
Matching Efficiency and Refugee Arrivals 
 The next factor, which might have an impact on the matching efficiency of the labor 
market of Minnesota, is refugee arrivals. It is widely known that several last decades Minnesota 
is among top states for refugee resettlement. The immigration policy in Minnesota is the 
important part of the policy of the state’s government which effects different socioeconomic 
aspects of the state, including its labor market. There are a lot of different opinions (sometimes 
very controversial opinions) about the level of effectiveness of the immigration policy in 
Minnesota. 
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 This section of the paper uses the primary refugee arrivals to Minnesota as the variable of 
research. Annual numbers of the primary refugee arrivals in 1995-2016 are presented in Table 
4.3. At the time of writing this paper, the number of primary refugee arrivals for the last year 
(2017) is not available, therefore 2017 year is not used for this chapter’s objectives.  
Table 4.3. Primary Refugee Arrivals to Minnesota, 1995-2016 
Year Refugee Arrivals 
Numbers % of Population  
1995 2,566 0.056 
1996 2,189 0.047 
1997 1,424 0.030 
1998 1,863 0.039 
1999 3,917 0.082 
2000 4,011 0.081 
2001 2,793 0.056 
2002 1,032 0.021 
2003 2,403 0.048 
2004 7,351 0.144 
2005 5,326 0.104 
2006 5,355 0.104 
2007 2,868 0.055 
2008 1,203 0.023 
2009 1,265 0.024 
2010 2,321 0.044 
2011 1,891 0.035 
2012 2,264 0.042 
2013 2,160 0.040 
2014 2,505 0.046 
2015 2,244 0.041 
2016 3,186 0.058 
 Source: http://www.health.state.mn.us  
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 We can see in the table above that the largest values of this variable (more than 5,000 
arrivals) are located in the middle of the studied time period (in 2004-2006). It should be noted 
that every year from 1995 until 2016, the numbers of primary refugee arrivals to Minnesota were 
larger than one thousand people.  
 Figure 4.6 presents both the numbers of refugee arrivals and the numbers of refugee 
arrivals as a percentage of the population of Minnesota. 
 
Figure 4.6. Primary Refugee Arrivals to Minnesota, 1995-2016 
 The figure above shows that two time series have almost identical dynamics. Therefore, 
we can draw a conclusion that there is no essential difference between them as the predictors of 
the matching efficiency of the labor market of Minnesota. However, this research uses the 
numbers of the primary refugee arrivals to Minnesota as the potential predictor of the state’s 
matching efficiency. 
 There is no clear position about the impact of the refugee arrivals on the labor market. 
Even authors, who consider that refugees might increase public expenditure, public debt, and 
unemployment, admit that these assumptions are highly vague, and depend on the numbers of 
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refugees, the duration of the procedures for processing and deciding asylum applications, and 
how soon refugees find jobs in the labor markets of receiving communities. The empirical 
relationship between the numbers of refugee arrivals and the matching efficiency of the national 
and local labor markets is unknown.  
 The correlation between the numbers of the primary refugee arrivals to Minnesota (in 
thousands) and matching efficiency is equal to 0.2163. Therefore, we can make a conclusion that 
there is a weak and positive empirical correlation between the primary refugee arrivals to 
Minnesota and the matching efficiency of the state’s labor market.  
 Figure 4.7 presents the actual values of matching efficiency, the predicted values, and the 
residuals of the model which has the equation Matching Efficiency = 0.4824 + 0.0171*Refugee 
Arrivals. 
 
Figure 4.7. Residuals, Actual and Predicted Values of the Model with Matching Efficiency as the 
Response Variable and Primary Refugee Arrivals as the Control Variable 
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Matching Efficiency and Medicaid Enrollment 
 The last variable in this research, which might have an influence on the matching 
efficiency of the labor market of Minnesota, is Medicaid enrollment. The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (the ACA, or Obamacare), passed in 2010, revised and expanded Medicaid 
eligibility starting in 2014.  
Table 4.4. Health Insurance Coverage Status in Minnesota, 1995-2016 
Year All Insured People Medicaid Coverage 
Numbers in 
thousands 
% Numbers in 
thousands 
% 
1995 4,260 92.0 542 11.7 
1996 4,229 89.8 550 11.7 
1997 4,329 90.8 631 13.2 
1998 4,385 90.7 424 8.8 
1999 4,556 93.4 388 8.0 
2000 4,502 92.0 331 6.8 
2001 4,582 93.1 388 7.9 
2002 4,657 92.1 477 9.4 
2003 4,634 91.3 488 9.6 
2004 4,702 91.7 433 8.4 
2005 4,740 92.4 486 9.5 
2006 4,692 91.1 608 11.8 
2007 4,775 92.0 573 11.0 
2008 4,717 91.6 628 12.2 
2009 4,724 90.9 697 13.4 
2010 4,776 90.9 745 14.2 
2011 4,819 91.2 773 14.6 
2012 4,895 92.0 773 14.5 
2013 4,923 91.8 779 14.5 
2014 5,081 94.1 895 16.6 
2015 5,187 95.5 988 18.2 
2016 5,237 95.9 990 18.1 
 Source: https://www.census.gov  
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 According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, Medicaid – a federal/state 
partnership with shared authority and financing – is a health insurance program for low-income 
individuals, children, their parents, the elderly and people with disabilities. Medicaid pays for 
health care for more than 74.5 million people nationally. Although participation is optional, all 
50 states participate in the Medicaid program. However, eligibility for Medicaid benefits varies 
widely among the states – all states must meet federal minimum requirements, but they have 
options for expanding Medicaid beyond the minimum federal guidelines. 
 Minnesota is among 32 states in which Medicaid expansion under the ACA was adopted. 
The annual numbers of all insured people in Minnesota and the numbers of Minnesotans covered 
by Medicaid are presented in Table 4.4 above. The numbers for the last year, 2017, are not 
available yet, therefore this section uses the 1995-2016 period. Table 4.4 shows that in 2016 only 
about four percent of Minnesotans were still uninsured. The number of state’s residents enrolled 
in Medicaid in 2016 is almost 1 million, which is approximately twice larger than it was in 1995 
and about three times larger than it was in 2000. 
 
Figure 4.8. People Covered by Medicaid and Percentage of Covered People, 1995-2016 
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 The number of people covered by the Medicaid program as a percentage of the state’s 
total population might be a more informative indicator. Figure 4.8 above presents the numbers of 
Minnesotans enrolled in Medicaid and the percentage of enrolled people at the same graph, and 
we can see that there is almost no difference between dynamics of these two variables. 
 The correlation coefficient between the matching efficiency of labor market of Minnesota 
and the percentage of people covered by Medicaid program is equal to -0.3188. It means that 
there is a moderate negative correlation between two variables. This empirical conclusion 
confirms the assumptions in the related literature that Medicaid expansion may have a negative 
effect on the labor market. 
 The actual values of matching efficiency, its predicted values by the regression equation 
Matching Efficiency = 0.6733 - 0.0118 * % of Medicaid Enrollment, and the residuals are 
presented in Figure 4.9. 
 
Figure 4.9. Residuals, Actual and Predicted Values of the Model with Matching Efficiency as the 
Response Variable and Percentage of Medicaid Enrollment as the Control Variable 
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Matching Efficiency and Combination of Studied Factors 
 The model with all available predictors of the matching efficiency of Minnesota’s labor 
market is explored at the end of this chapter. 
 According to Wooldridge (2013), multiple regression analysis is more adaptable to 
ceteris paribus analysis because it allows us to explicitly control for many other factors that 
simultaneously affect the dependent variable. The author considers that “this is important both 
for testing economic theories and for evaluating policy effects when we must rely on 
nonexperimental data. Because multiple regression models can accommodate many explanatory 
variables that may be correlated, we can hope to infer causality in cases where simple regression 
analysis would be misleading” (p.68). 
 The multiple linear regression model is built for these purposes. Matching efficiency is a 
regressand of this model. The real minimum wage, government spending as a percentage of 
GDP, the primary refugee arrivals, and people covered by Medicaid program as a percentage of 
the total population are regressors of this model. 
 There are no any theoretical assumptions in the economic and econometric literature 
about joint significance of these four independent variables in the regression model where the 
matching efficiency of the labor market is the response variable. 
 The results of this model are presented in Table 4.5. According to the statistical summary 
of this model, 12.08% of the total variation is explained by the regression model and the value of 
adjusted RSquare is 10.72%. Only one predictor – the percentage of people covered by Medicaid 
– is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Three other predictors are not statistically 
significant.  
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Table 4.5. Results and Estimates of the Model with Matching Efficiency as the Response 
Variable and Four Studied Variables as the Control Variables 
Linear Regression Equation:  
ME = 0.986592 - 0.002749*RMW - 1.797846*%GS + 0.003582*RA - 0.009400*%MdE 
Summary of Fit:  
Observations 264 
RSquare 0.120776 
RSquare Adj. 0.107197 
Root Mean Square Error 0.113110 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.699611 
Parameter Estimates:  
Intercept:  
Estimate 0.986592 
Standard Error 0.211160 
t Ratio 4.67 
Prob > | t | < 0.0001* 
Real Minimum Wage:  
Estimate -0.002749 
Standard Error 0.024020 
t Ratio -0.11 
Prob > | t | 0.9090 
Government Spending (% of GDP):  
Estimate -1.797846 
Standard Error 0.935352 
t Ratio -1.92 
Prob > | t | 0.0557 
Refugee Arrivals:  
Estimate 0.003582 
Standard Error 0.005859 
t Ratio 0.61 
Prob > | t | 0.5415 
% of Medicaid Enrollment:  
Estimate -0.009400 
Standard Error 0.003211 
t Ratio -2.93 
Prob > | t | 0.0037* 
F Ratio 8.8945 
Prob > F < 0.0001* 
                       Note: * Significant at the 1 percent level. 
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 However, according to the value of the F ratio, the overall regression model is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Therefore, we can conclude that four control 
variables of this model are jointly statistically significant at this level. 
 Figure 4.10 presents the actual values of matching efficiency, its predicted values, and the 
residuals of this model. 
 
Figure 4.10. Residuals, Actual and Predicted Values of the Model with Matching Efficiency as 
the Response Variable and Four Studied Variables as the Control Variables 
 For better understanding the results of this regression model, it is useful to look at the 
correlation coefficients between studied variables. Table 4.6 shows that the response variable, 
matching efficiency, does not have strong association with independent variables. The highest 
value of the correlation coefficients is about -0.32 between matching efficiency and Medicaid 
enrollment. The absolute values of the correlation coefficients between the regressand and other 
regressors are close to 0.2.  
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Table 4.6. Correlation Coefficients between Studied Variables 
 ME RMW GS%GDP RA %MdE 
Matching Efficiency 1 -0.2114 -0.2252 0.2163 -0.3188 
Real Minimum Wage -0.2114 1 0.1048 -0.2093 0.7042 
Gov. Spend. as % of GDP -0.2252 0.1048 1 -0.5726 0.2420 
Refugee Arrivals 0.2163 -0.2093 -0.5726 1 -0.3577 
% of Medicaid Enrollment -0.3188 0.7042 0.2420 -0.3577 1 
 
 In addition, we can see that multicollinearity is present in the data. Some independent 
variables are strongly correlated with each other. For example, the correlation coefficient 
between the real minimum wage and Medicaid enrollment is about 0.7.  
 According to Larose and Larose (2015), “multicollinearity leads to instability in the 
solution space, leading to possible incoherent results” (p.259). The authors claim that in a data 
set with severe multicollinearity, it is possible that the F-test for the overall regression is 
significant, while all t-tests for the individual predictors are not significant. In our case, the 
situation is almost the same, the F ratio of the overall regression is significant at the 1 percent 
level, whereas the t ratios of three predictors are not statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
 This thesis computes the matching efficiency of the labor market of Minnesota in 1995-
2017 and investigates the impact of government policy on the calculated matching efficiency.  
 In the time framework analyzed in this paper, matching efficiency has a weak and 
negative linear correlation with the unemployment rate in Minnesota. This empirical finding 
confirms the theoretical assumption that these two important indicators of the labor market have 
a negative correlation. 
 The real minimum wage has a negative correlation with matching efficiency, which 
confirms the assumptions in the literature that the increase in the minimum wage reduces 
employment. However, the linear correlation between two variables is weak. 
 The correlation between matching efficiency and government spending as a percentage of 
Minnesota’s GDP is slightly stronger that the previous correlation. The correlation coefficient is 
negative and this empirical result of research supports the theoretical assumptions in the related 
literature that government spending for the most part has a negative economic impact on the 
labor market. 
 There is only one element of government policy explored in this research which has a 
positive correlation with matching efficiency. This predictor is the number of primary refugee 
arrivals to Minnesota. According to the equation of the simple linear regression model, the 
increase in the refugee arrivals by one thousand people leads to the increase in matching 
efficiency by 0.017 (or 1.7%). Despite of the weak correlation between two variables, this 
empirical conclusion might be used as an evidence-based argument in a polemic about the 
economic impact of refugee arrivals to Minnesota. However, it should be noted that government 
policy directly does not affect the specific numbers of refugee arrivals. The state’s government 
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can stop the process of refugee resettlement in Minnesota (in this case the number of refugee 
arrivals would be zero), but the government cannot directly increase or reduce these numbers 
after opening the doors to refugees from different countries. The particular annual numbers of 
the refugee arrivals depend on other social or economic factors, but do not depend on 
government policy. 
 The impact of Medicaid enrollment on the matching efficiency of Minnesota is negative 
and stronger than the effect of other three predictors. The linear correlation between two 
variables is equal to -0.32. The theoretical assumptions in the related literature that the Medicaid 
expansion reduces employment and, consequently, has a negative effect on the labor market, are 
confirmed by the empirical results of this research.  
 Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that all conclusions above might be false if the 
initial data is not trustworthy. Concretely, one of the main variables, which is used in this paper, 
is the number of new hires. In the framework analyzed in this thesis, the number of new hires 
means the number of unemployed people who have found a job. Unfortunately, the variable, 
which is available from the Current Population Surveys, does not distinguish workers who have 
found their jobs being unemployed and people who have simply changed their jobs without 
being unemployed. If workers from the second group represent the majority of the new hires, for 
that time period the calculated value of the job finding rate is not reliable for this research. 
Hypothetically, it might be possible that the job finding rate might have the value greater than 1, 
which makes the values of matching efficiency for those periods inaccurate in the framework of 
the Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant returns to scale. 
 The other problem with this variable is that people from other states might use online 
advertisements of Minnesota’s companies to find new jobs and move to Minnesota. In this case, 
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the number of new hires can also rise without any participation of unemployed residents of 
Minnesota. For this reason, the initial data might not be credible in the framework of the Cobb-
Douglas matching function. 
 Further empirical research in this field is clearly warranted to study the impact of the 
other elements of government policy on the matching efficiency of the labor market. The 
implications of this study might be very useful for additional explorations of the labor market. 
 One direction for further research is comparing the levels of the matching efficiency of 
different states or industries and examining the causes of these differences. The study of 
differences might be useful for an insight into reasons of the state-to-state migration and an 
investigation of factors making specific states and industries more attractive than others. 
 Another direction is to study how effectively government policy impacts on the labor 
market’s matching efficiency. The further research in this field might help to find more effectual 
tools to reduce the unemployment rate and to achieve the higher rates of consistent economic 
growth. 
 This thesis is only a small step in these directions. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this paper 
would serve as a local illustration of important processes of a whole economy. 
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Appendix 1 
Job Finding Rate in Minnesota (1995-2017) 
Jan 1995 0.2851 Jan 1998 0.3586 Jan 2001 0.3915 Jan 2004 0.1923 
Feb 1995 0.3094 Feb 1998 0.3897 Feb 2001 0.4357 Feb 2004 0.2287 
Mar 1995 0.3496 Mar 1998 0.3000 Mar 2001 0.3000 Mar 2004 0.2120 
Apr 1995 0.2321 Apr 1998 0.3211 Apr 2001 0.3223 Apr 2004 0.2719 
May 1995 0.2963 May 1998 0.3693 May 2001 0.2601 May 2004 0.2306 
Jun 1995 0.2905 Jun 1998 0.3720 Jun 2001 0.4170 Jun 2004 0.2075 
Jul 1995 0.2617 Jul 1998 0.4184 Jul 2001 0.2320 Jul 2004 0.2381 
Aug 1995 0.3659 Aug 1998 0.3992 Aug 2001 0.2837 Aug 2004 0.2325 
Sep 1995 0.2604 Sep 1998 0.3200 Sep 2001 0.3308 Sep 2004 0.1791 
Oct 1995 0.1960 Oct 1998 0.2929 Oct 2001 0.1820 Oct 2004 0.2591 
Nov 1995 0.2516 Nov 1998 0.3337 Nov 2001 0.1867 Nov 2004 0.3266 
Dec 1995 0.2670 Dec 1998 0.2279 Dec 2001 0.1780 Dec 2004 0.2302 
Jan 1996 0.2237 Jan 1999 0.3514 Jan 2002 0.1394 Jan 2005 0.2877 
Feb 1996 0.2890 Feb 1999 0.3768 Feb 2002 0.1966 Feb 2005 0.2521 
Mar 1996 0.2028 Mar 1999 0.4832 Mar 2002 0.1545 Mar 2005 0.2725 
Apr 1996 0.2221 Apr 1999 0.3465 Apr 2002 0.1595 Apr 2005 0.2721 
May 1996 0.3279 May 1999 0.2973 May 2002 0.1777 May 2005 0.2293 
Jun 1996 0.2694 Jun 1999 0.2674 Jun 2002 0.1742 Jun 2005 0.2825 
Jul 1996 0.2175 Jul 1999 0.2034 Jul 2002 0.1640 Jul 2005 0.3512 
Aug 1996 0.1958 Aug 1999 0.3242 Aug 2002 0.2565 Aug 2005 0.3299 
Sep 1996 0.2047 Sep 1999 0.3265 Sep 2002 0.1843 Sep 2005 0.2360 
Oct 1996 0.1521 Oct 1999 0.2980 Oct 2002 0.2455 Oct 2005 0.2877 
Nov 1996 0.2691 Nov 1999 0.2351 Nov 2002 0.2473 Nov 2005 0.2734 
Dec 1996 0.3245 Dec 1999 0.2710 Dec 2002 0.2337 Dec 2005 0.2802 
Jan 1997 0.2478 Jan 2000 0.3026 Jan 2003 0.2000 Jan 2006 0.2474 
Feb 1997 0.3544 Feb 2000 0.3474 Feb 2003 0.1415 Feb 2006 0.3008 
Mar 1997 0.2840 Mar 2000 0.3064 Mar 2003 0.1559 Mar 2006 0.3656 
Apr 1997 0.2907 Apr 2000 0.2652 Apr 2003 0.2024 Apr 2006 0.3797 
May 1997 0.2340 May 2000 0.1667 May 2003 0.2032 May 2006 0.4044 
Jun 1997 0.3167 Jun 2000 0.4206 Jun 2003 0.1751 Jun 2006 0.3409 
Jul 1997 0.3290 Jul 2000 0.3392 Jul 2003 0.1553 Jul 2006 0.2765 
Aug 1997 0.3027 Aug 2000 0.3309 Aug 2003 0.2344 Aug 2006 0.3738 
Sep 1997 0.2163 Sep 2000 0.3409 Sep 2003 0.1317 Sep 2006 0.2610 
Oct 1997 0.2676 Oct 2000 0.3738 Oct 2003 0.1554 Oct 2006 0.2436 
Nov 1997 0.3788 Nov 2000 0.2589 Nov 2003 0.1741 Nov 2006 0.3332 
Dec 1997 0.4194 Dec 2000 0.2079 Dec 2003 0.1916 Dec 2006 0.3054 
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Jan 2007 0.2860 Jan 2010 0.1102 Jan 2013 0.1529 Jan 2016 0.2541 
Feb 2007 0.2213 Feb 2010 0.1733 Feb 2013 0.2988 Feb 2016 0.2114 
Mar 2007 0.1809 Mar 2010 0.1065 Mar 2013 0.2261 Mar 2016 0.2545 
Apr 2007 0.2496 Apr 2010 0.1863 Apr 2013 0.1801 Apr 2016 0.3190 
May 2007 0.3002 May 2010 0.1140 May 2013 0.2860 May 2016 0.3147 
Jun 2007 0.3263 Jun 2010 0.1653 Jun 2013 0.2238 Jun 2016 0.4428 
Jul 2007 0.3373 Jul 2010 0.1238 Jul 2013 0.3278 Jul 2016 0.2860 
Aug 2007 0.2663 Aug 2010 0.1346 Aug 2013 0.2532 Aug 2016 0.2953 
Sep 2007 0.3866 Sep 2010 0.1996 Sep 2013 0.3446 Sep 2016 0.3660 
Oct 2007 0.3328 Oct 2010 0.1398 Oct 2013 0.3487 Oct 2016 0.3126 
Nov 2007 0.2486 Nov 2010 0.1700 Nov 2013 0.2738 Nov 2016 0.4076 
Dec 2007 0.2195 Dec 2010 0.2263 Dec 2013 0.1654 Dec 2016 0.2747 
Jan 2008 0.2075 Jan 2011 0.1755 Jan 2014 0.2086 Jan 2017 0.4052 
Feb 2008 0.2257 Feb 2011 0.1084 Feb 2014 0.2779 Feb 2017 0.2860 
Mar 2008 0.2995 Mar 2011 0.1401 Mar 2014 0.2671 Mar 2017 0.3973 
Apr 2008 0.2681 Apr 2011 0.1550 Apr 2014 0.2188 Apr 2017 0.1781 
May 2008 0.1700 May 2011 0.1540 May 2014 0.1991 May 2017 0.5173 
Jun 2008 0.3725 Jun 2011 0.2038 Jun 2014 0.3510 Jun 2017 0.2610 
Jul 2008 0.1988 Jul 2011 0.1572 Jul 2014 0.2194 Jul 2017 0.4526 
Aug 2008 0.2351 Aug 2011 0.1364 Aug 2014 0.3224 Aug 2017 0.4225 
Sep 2008 0.2847 Sep 2011 0.3347 Sep 2014 0.4331 Sep 2017 0.5431 
Oct 2008 0.3683 Oct 2011 0.3993 Oct 2014 0.2731 Oct 2017 0.3192 
Nov 2008 0.1555 Nov 2011 0.1989 Nov 2014 0.3079 Nov 2017 0.3075 
Dec 2008 0.1726 Dec 2011 0.2071 Dec 2014 0.2541 Dec 2017 0.3676 
Jan 2009 0.2055 Jan 2012 0.2822 Jan 2015 0.3161   
Feb 2009 0.1295 Feb 2012 0.1880 Feb 2015 0.3061   
Mar 2009 0.1575 Mar 2012 0.1402 Mar 2015 0.2333   
Apr 2009 0.0685 Apr 2012 0.1691 Apr 2015 0.3899   
May 2009 0.1571 May 2012 0.2190 May 2015 0.2125   
Jun 2009 0.1819 Jun 2012 0.2207 Jun 2015 0.3367   
Jul 2009 0.1254 Jul 2012 0.1788 Jul 2015 0.4709   
Aug 2009 0.1441 Aug 2012 0.3270 Aug 2015 0.5739   
Sep 2009 0.2186 Sep 2012 0.2689 Sep 2015 0.5259   
Oct 2009 0.1356 Oct 2012 0.2793 Oct 2015 0.3829   
Nov 2009 0.1313 Nov 2012 0.2299 Nov 2015 0.5089   
Dec 2009 0.1058 Dec 2012 0.3013 Dec 2015 0.2050   
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Appendix 2 
Average Labor Market Tightness in Minnesota (1995-2017) 
Jan 1995 0.3386 Jan 1998 0.4573 Jan 2001 0.3878 Jan 2004 0.1743 
Feb 1995 0.2887 Feb 1998 0.4750 Feb 2001 0.4467 Feb 2004 0.1606 
Mar 1995 0.3972 Mar 1998 0.3936 Mar 2001 0.3643 Mar 2004 0.1639 
Apr 1995 0.3152 Apr 1998 0.3854 Apr 2001 0.3164 Apr 2004 0.1974 
May 1995 0.2912 May 1998 0.4181 May 2001 0.3193 May 2004 0.2375 
Jun 1995 0.2905 Jun 1998 0.3923 Jun 2001 0.3185 Jun 2004 0.1726 
Jul 1995 0.3585 Jul 1998 0.6191 Jul 2001 0.2316 Jul 2004 0.1926 
Aug 1995 0.5193 Aug 1998 0.6375 Aug 2001 0.2140 Aug 2004 0.1576 
Sep 1995 0.3142 Sep 1998 0.4003 Sep 2001 0.2364 Sep 2004 0.1809 
Oct 1995 0.2201 Oct 1998 0.4351 Oct 2001 0.1846 Oct 2004 0.2192 
Nov 1995 0.2834 Nov 1998 0.3616 Nov 2001 0.1728 Nov 2004 0.2100 
Dec 1995 0.2702 Dec 1998 0.3130 Dec 2001 0.1816 Dec 2004 0.2322 
Jan 1996 0.3443 Jan 1999 0.4826 Jan 2002 0.1286 Jan 2005 0.3355 
Feb 1996 0.2967 Feb 1999 0.4276 Feb 2002 0.1242 Feb 2005 0.3166 
Mar 1996 0.2516 Mar 1999 0.5895 Mar 2002 0.1247 Mar 2005 0.2221 
Apr 1996 0.2852 Apr 1999 0.5075 Apr 2002 0.1406 Apr 2005 0.2878 
May 1996 0.3448 May 1999 0.4843 May 2002 0.1444 May 2005 0.2334 
Jun 1996 0.2806 Jun 1999 0.3288 Jun 2002 0.1854 Jun 2005 0.2908 
Jul 1996 0.2523 Jul 1999 0.3021 Jul 2002 0.1436 Jul 2005 0.3792 
Aug 1996 0.2483 Aug 1999 0.4696 Aug 2002 0.1552 Aug 2005 0.2899 
Sep 1996 0.2439 Sep 1999 0.4250 Sep 2002 0.1986 Sep 2005 0.2553 
Oct 1996 0.2927 Oct 1999 0.5249 Oct 2002 0.1850 Oct 2005 0.3058 
Nov 1996 0.2903 Nov 1999 0.2828 Nov 2002 0.1753 Nov 2005 0.2727 
Dec 1996 0.3865 Dec 1999 0.4188 Dec 2002 0.1890 Dec 2005 0.2585 
Jan 1997 0.2959 Jan 2000 0.3326 Jan 2003 0.1150 Jan 2006 0.2691 
Feb 1997 0.4867 Feb 2000 0.4034 Feb 2003 0.1336 Feb 2006 0.2809 
Mar 1997 0.4429 Mar 2000 0.3016 Mar 2003 0.1373 Mar 2006 0.3338 
Apr 1997 0.2695 Apr 2000 0.3846 Apr 2003 0.1358 Apr 2006 0.3188 
May 1997 0.3199 May 2000 0.2748 May 2003 0.1307 May 2006 0.3933 
Jun 1997 0.3517 Jun 2000 0.5177 Jun 2003 0.1575 Jun 2006 0.4118 
Jul 1997 0.3420 Jul 2000 0.4286 Jul 2003 0.1406 Jul 2006 0.3795 
Aug 1997 0.2669 Aug 2000 0.3230 Aug 2003 0.1742 Aug 2006 0.4284 
Sep 1997 0.2984 Sep 2000 0.3704 Sep 2003 0.1323 Sep 2006 0.3247 
Oct 1997 0.2816 Oct 2000 0.3704 Oct 2003 0.1425 Oct 2006 0.3325 
Nov 1997 0.4259 Nov 2000 0.2958 Nov 2003 0.1570 Nov 2006 0.3361 
Dec 1997 0.3723 Dec 2000 0.3457 Dec 2003 0.1530 Dec 2006 0.3110 
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Jan 2007 0.3314 Jan 2010 0.1659 Jan 2013 0.2924 Jan 2016 0.5514 
Feb 2007 0.3269 Feb 2010 0.1630 Feb 2013 0.3770 Feb 2016 0.5394 
Mar 2007 0.4209 Mar 2010 0.1503 Mar 2013 0.3603 Mar 2016 0.4863 
Apr 2007 0.3718 Apr 2010 0.1571 Apr 2013 0.3141 Apr 2016 0.4808 
May 2007 0.3313 May 2010 0.1827 May 2013 0.3267 May 2016 0.5489 
Jun 2007 0.3571 Jun 2010 0.1644 Jun 2013 0.3919 Jun 2016 0.5492 
Jul 2007 0.3554 Jul 2010 0.1670 Jul 2013 0.3336 Jul 2016 0.6181 
Aug 2007 0.3034 Aug 2010 0.1677 Aug 2013 0.3633 Aug 2016 0.4779 
Sep 2007 0.3019 Sep 2010 0.1831 Sep 2013 0.3246 Sep 2016 0.5182 
Oct 2007 0.3163 Oct 2010 0.1890 Oct 2013 0.3338 Oct 2016 0.4238 
Nov 2007 0.3735 Nov 2010 0.2072 Nov 2013 0.3424 Nov 2016 0.4028 
Dec 2007 0.3113 Dec 2010 0.2202 Dec 2013 0.3595 Dec 2016 0.3866 
Jan 2008 0.3869 Jan 2011 0.2475 Jan 2014 0.3602 Jan 2017 0.4528 
Feb 2008 0.3602 Feb 2011 0.2247 Feb 2014 0.4337 Feb 2017 0.4244 
Mar 2008 0.3356 Mar 2011 0.2530 Mar 2014 0.3790 Mar 2017 0.5686 
Apr 2008 0.2907 Apr 2011 0.2502 Apr 2014 0.4207 Apr 2017 0.4840 
May 2008 0.2605 May 2011 0.2331 May 2014 0.4212 May 2017 0.5108 
Jun 2008 0.2953 Jun 2011 0.2269 Jun 2014 0.4495 Jun 2017 0.4631 
Jul 2008 0.2480 Jul 2011 0.2042 Jul 2014 0.4964 Jul 2017 0.5119 
Aug 2008 0.2312 Aug 2011 0.2490 Aug 2014 0.4624 Aug 2017 0.4223 
Sep 2008 0.2681 Sep 2011 0.3139 Sep 2014 0.4440 Sep 2017 0.5675 
Oct 2008 0.2562 Oct 2011 0.3516 Oct 2014 0.4746 Oct 2017 0.5696 
Nov 2008 0.1928 Nov 2011 0.3324 Nov 2014 0.5667 Nov 2017 0.5454 
Dec 2008 0.1968 Dec 2011 0.3323 Dec 2014 0.5380 Dec 2017 0.4789 
Jan 2009 0.1297 Jan 2012 0.3531 Jan 2015 0.4101   
Feb 2009 0.1242 Feb 2012 0.2596 Feb 2015 0.4558   
Mar 2009 0.1408 Mar 2012 0.2949 Mar 2015 0.4483   
Apr 2009 0.1147 Apr 2012 0.3905 Apr 2015 0.4903   
May 2009 0.1369 May 2012 0.2996 May 2015 0.5048   
Jun 2009 0.1084 Jun 2012 0.3142 Jun 2015 0.4890   
Jul 2009 0.1270 Jul 2012 0.2936 Jul 2015 0.5560   
Aug 2009 0.1331 Aug 2012 0.3312 Aug 2015 0.5631   
Sep 2009 0.1313 Sep 2012 0.3261 Sep 2015 0.5860   
Oct 2009 0.1186 Oct 2012 0.3375 Oct 2015 0.4920   
Nov 2009 0.1290 Nov 2012 0.3439 Nov 2015 0.5243   
Dec 2009 0.1514 Dec 2012 0.3547 Dec 2015 0.4675   
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Appendix 3 
Matching Efficiency in Minnesota (1995-2017) 
Jan 1995 0.5423 Jan 1998 0.5706 Jan 2001 0.6871 Jan 2004 0.5426 
Feb 1995 0.6470 Feb 1998 0.6063 Feb 2001 0.7031 Feb 2004 0.6774 
Mar 1995 0.6050 Mar 1998 0.5219 Mar 2001 0.5464 Mar 2004 0.6206 
Apr 1995 0.4606 Apr 1998 0.5656 Apr 2001 0.6382 Apr 2004 0.7129 
May 1995 0.6165 May 1998 0.6199 May 2001 0.5123 May 2004 0.5415 
Jun 1995 0.6053 Jun 1998 0.6484 Jun 2001 0.8226 Jun 2004 0.5890 
Jul 1995 0.4812 Jul 1998 0.5562 Jul 2001 0.5530 Jul 2004 0.6332 
Aug 1995 0.5400 Aug 1998 0.5215 Aug 2001 0.7086 Aug 2004 0.6967 
Sep 1995 0.5179 Sep 1998 0.5512 Sep 2001 0.7790 Sep 2004 0.4944 
Oct 1995 0.4816 Oct 1998 0.4801 Oct 2001 0.4964 Oct 2004 0.6383 
Nov 1995 0.5321 Nov 1998 0.6104 Nov 2001 0.5294 Nov 2004 0.8253 
Dec 1995 0.5808 Dec 1998 0.4542 Dec 2001 0.4903 Dec 2004 0.5478 
Jan 1996 0.4214 Jan 1999 0.5416 Jan 2002 0.4714 Jan 2005 0.5503 
Feb 1996 0.5946 Feb 1999 0.6241 Feb 2002 0.6785 Feb 2005 0.4991 
Mar 1996 0.4603 Mar 1999 0.6613 Mar 2002 0.5318 Mar 2005 0.6657 
Apr 1996 0.4679 Apr 1999 0.5184 Apr 2002 0.5113 Apr 2005 0.5701 
May 1996 0.6171 May 1999 0.4572 May 2002 0.5607 May 2005 0.5441 
Jun 1996 0.5730 Jun 1999 0.5176 Jun 2002 0.4738 Jun 2005 0.5882 
Jul 1996 0.4928 Jul 1999 0.4141 Jul 2002 0.5192 Jul 2005 0.6246 
Aug 1996 0.4477 Aug 1999 0.5078 Aug 2002 0.7756 Aug 2005 0.6883 
Sep 1996 0.4733 Sep 1999 0.5428 Sep 2002 0.4813 Sep 2005 0.5310 
Oct 1996 0.3155 Oct 1999 0.4370 Oct 2002 0.6689 Oct 2005 0.5816 
Nov 1996 0.5610 Nov 1999 0.4977 Nov 2002 0.6955 Nov 2005 0.5914 
Dec 1996 0.5708 Dec 1999 0.4545 Dec 2002 0.6285 Dec 2005 0.6257 
Jan 1997 0.5108 Jan 2000 0.5818 Jan 2003 0.7224 Jan 2006 0.5394 
Feb 1997 0.5435 Feb 2000 0.5957 Feb 2003 0.4678 Feb 2006 0.6393 
Mar 1997 0.4606 Mar 2000 0.6243 Mar 2003 0.5069 Mar 2006 0.7014 
Apr 1997 0.6334 Apr 2000 0.4678 Apr 2003 0.6625 Apr 2006 0.7488 
May 1997 0.4604 May 2000 0.3590 May 2003 0.6805 May 2006 0.7038 
Jun 1997 0.5890 Jun 2000 0.6218 Jun 2003 0.5249 Jun 2006 0.5773 
Jul 1997 0.6223 Jul 2000 0.5610 Jul 2003 0.4980 Jul 2006 0.4915 
Aug 1997 0.6632 Aug 2000 0.6473 Aug 2003 0.6616 Aug 2006 0.6184 
Sep 1997 0.4436 Sep 2000 0.6149 Sep 2003 0.4380 Sep 2006 0.5091 
Oct 1997 0.5680 Oct 2000 0.6743 Oct 2003 0.4942 Oct 2006 0.4684 
Nov 1997 0.6289 Nov 2000 0.5338 Nov 2003 0.5227 Nov 2006 0.6367 
Dec 1997 0.7541 Dec 2000 0.3906 Dec 2003 0.5844 Dec 2006 0.6110 
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Jan 2007 0.5511 Jan 2010 0.3203 Jan 2013 0.3173 Jan 2016 0.3619 
Feb 2007 0.4300 Feb 2010 0.5090 Feb 2013 0.5333 Feb 2016 0.3050 
Mar 2007 0.3024 Mar 2010 0.3282 Mar 2013 0.4146 Mar 2016 0.3905 
Apr 2007 0.4492 Apr 2010 0.5592 Apr 2013 0.3583 Apr 2016 0.4928 
May 2007 0.5786 May 2010 0.3128 May 2013 0.5557 May 2016 0.4493 
Jun 2007 0.6015 Jun 2010 0.4829 Jun 2013 0.3903 Jun 2016 0.6321 
Jul 2007 0.6235 Jul 2010 0.3584 Jul 2013 0.6292 Jul 2016 0.3806 
Aug 2007 0.5407 Aug 2010 0.3888 Aug 2013 0.4620 Aug 2016 0.4578 
Sep 2007 0.7874 Sep 2010 0.5469 Sep 2013 0.6723 Sep 2016 0.5408 
Oct 2007 0.6593 Oct 2010 0.3760 Oct 2013 0.6689 Oct 2016 0.5205 
Nov 2007 0.4461 Nov 2010 0.4329 Nov 2013 0.5174 Nov 2016 0.6994 
Dec 2007 0.4389 Dec 2010 0.5560 Dec 2013 0.3037 Dec 2016 0.4830 
Jan 2008 0.3647 Jan 2011 0.4023 Jan 2014 0.3825 Jan 2017 0.6486 
Feb 2008 0.4139 Feb 2011 0.2630 Feb 2014 0.4563 Feb 2017 0.4759 
Mar 2008 0.5728 Mar 2011 0.3168 Mar 2014 0.4753 Mar 2017 0.5555 
Apr 2008 0.5583 Apr 2011 0.3528 Apr 2014 0.3658 Apr 2017 0.2740 
May 2008 0.3778 May 2011 0.3658 May 2014 0.3328 May 2017 0.7709 
Jun 2008 0.7687 Jun 2011 0.4916 Jun 2014 0.5644 Jun 2017 0.4123 
Jul 2008 0.4550 Jul 2011 0.4037 Jul 2014 0.3326 Jul 2017 0.6737 
Aug 2008 0.5609 Aug 2011 0.3114 Aug 2014 0.5097 Aug 2017 0.7049 
Sep 2008 0.6220 Sep 2011 0.6661 Sep 2014 0.7015 Sep 2017 0.7603 
Oct 2008 0.8269 Oct 2011 0.7427 Oct 2014 0.4251 Oct 2017 0.4459 
Nov 2008 0.4134 Nov 2011 0.3825 Nov 2014 0.4314 Nov 2017 0.4408 
Dec 2008 0.4532 Dec 2011 0.3984 Dec 2014 0.3673 Dec 2017 0.5692 
Jan 2009 0.6911 Jan 2012 0.5237 Jan 2015 0.5367   
Feb 2009 0.4468 Feb 2012 0.4187 Feb 2015 0.4881   
Mar 2009 0.5045 Mar 2012 0.2895 Mar 2015 0.3757   
Apr 2009 0.2478 Apr 2012 0.2955 Apr 2015 0.5953   
May 2009 0.5115 May 2012 0.4480 May 2015 0.3189   
Jun 2009 0.6805 Jun 2012 0.4389 Jun 2015 0.5149   
Jul 2009 0.4269 Jul 2012 0.3701 Jul 2015 0.6674   
Aug 2009 0.4772 Aug 2012 0.6303 Aug 2015 0.8072   
Sep 2009 0.7300 Sep 2012 0.5231 Sep 2015 0.7224   
Oct 2009 0.4810 Oct 2012 0.5324 Oct 2015 0.5834   
Nov 2009 0.4430 Nov 2012 0.4334 Nov 2015 0.7467   
Dec 2009 0.3247 Dec 2012 0.5576 Dec 2015 0.3220   
 
